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ANTITRUST SUITS BY DISCHARGED
EMPLOYEES
Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. (In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation)
Federal courts have struggled to define the scope of standing to sue for
private treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.2 The confusion
surrounding antitrust standing appears in suits brought by individuals who
claim that they have been discharged for refusing to commit antitrust viola-
tions for their employers.3 The Ninth Circuit has granted standing4 while the
Seventh Circuit has denied it5 in factually indistinguishable cases. District
courts in the Third Circuit have split on the issue.' In light of recent Supreme
Court pronouncements, the position taken by the Seventh Circuit in Bichan v.
Chemetron Corp.1 represents the correct approach. In Bichan, the court prop-
erly recognized that injuries caused by an antitrust violation but occurring
outside the sector of the economy endangered by the anticompetitive effect are
not antitrust injuries under section 4.8 Moreover, the court correctly realized
that suffering an antitrust injury does not necessarily confer standing.9
An overview of limitations on private treble damage suits illustrates the
propriety of the Bichan reasoning. A plaintiff must allege an "antitrust injury"
and prove "antitrust standing." The injury requirement is explained in Bruns-
1. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
2. "[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws ... shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The "antitrust laws"
for § 4 purposes are defined in id. § 12 & note. There is no private treble damage action for
violations of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1982), or section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). The term "standing" in this Note de-
scribes parties who are entitled to maintain private antitrust actions under § 4. See Berger &
Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 813 n.1 1 (1977).
3. See generally Note, Employee Standing in Private Antitrust Suits: A New Element in
the Balance, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 878 (1982); Note, Discharged Employees: Should They Ever
Have Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 34 HASMINGS L.J. 839 (1983);
Note, Employee Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 1846 (1983);
Annot., 64 A.L.R. FED. 825 (1983).
4. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and re-
manded mem., 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
5. See Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1261 (1983); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
6. Compare McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) and Callahan v.
Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) and Booth v. Radio Shack Div., 1982-83
Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,001 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1982) with Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F.
Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
7. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
8. Id. at 519.
9. Id. at 519-20.
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
wick Corp. v. Bowl-O-Matic1 ° and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois."1 In Bruns-
wick, the plaintiffs, operators of bowling alleys, complained that the defen-
dant's acquisition of several financially troubled bowling centers violated
section 7 of the Clayton Act 12 by lessening competition or tending to create a
monopoly.13 The plaintiffs alleged that their profits would have increased if the
defendant would not have made these acquisitions, for the alleys would have
closed.1 4 The Court denied recovery under section 4, finding that the plaintiffs'
injuries resulted from the preservation of, rather than the elimination of, com-
petition.25 Thus, the plaintiffs had failed to prove an "antitrust injury"-harm
that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, flowing from the defendant's
unlawful act. 1
In Illinois Brick, the plaintiffs brought suit for treble damages under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act1 7 against concrete block manufacturers for price
fixing. The blocks had originally been sold to masonry contractors, who sub-
mitted bids to general contractors that bid on the plaintiffs' projects.'" The
Court found unacceptable the iisk of duplicative recovery engendered by al-
lowing both indirect and direct purchasers to claim damages resultigg from a
single overcharge.19 The Court concluded that the masonry contractors, as di-
rect purchasers, were the injured parties most likely to press their claims with
the vigor that section 4 was intended to promote.20 Although the plaintiffs
suffered antitrust injury, the Court found that the risk of duplicative recovery,
the difficulty in tracing damages to indirect purchasers, and the ability of
other more direct plaintiffs to bring suit militated against allowing the plain-
tiffs' suit.2" Thus, limitations similar to proximate cause in tort are part of the
10. 429 U.S 477 (1977).
II. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
13. 429 U.S. at 480.
14. Id. at 481.
15. Id. at 488-89.
16. Id. at 489.
17. 431 U.S. at 727. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
18. 431 U.S. at 726.
19. Id. at 730-31; see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1972)
(denying recovery to state for damages to its general economy on the ground that such damages
would duplicate recoveries by individual citizens and businesses); Ames v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 166 F. 820, 823 (D. Mass. 1909) (stockholder denied recovery since injury was duplicative of
injury sustained by company). For a discussion on the economic repercussions of a single antitrust
violation, see Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Deter-
mination of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 795, 796-97
(1976). But cf. Tyler, Private Antitrust Litigation; The Problem of Standing, 49 U. COLO. L.
REV. 269, 289-92 (1978) (threat of multiple liability is often illusory and econometric techniques
can minimize risk).
20. 431 U.S. at 746.
21. Id. This principle is shown in suits by employees who have lost their jobs because
corporations who employed them have been driven out of business or otherwise injured by anti-
trust violations. Standing is usually denied because the employee has been injured only in a deriv-
ative manner. See Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 1983) (chair-
man of the board); Program Eng'g, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188, 1191-92
[Vol. 49
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss1/13
1984] EMPLOYEE ANTITRUST SUITS 137
test for antitrust injury.
Concurrent with these cases, the lower courts formulated diffuse doctrines
of "antitrust standing." Using various tests,22 these courts tried to determine
which injuries are too remote to support private treble damage actions. This
complicated analysis applied the standing tests to various categories of plain-
tiffs to simplify the determination.23 Nevertheless, the inclusion of numerous
policy considerations precluded consistent results or uniform application. The
(9th Cir. 1980) (company president); Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 397-98 (10th Cir.
1979) (president, general manager, and shareholder); Bosse v. Crowell, Collier & McMillan, 565
F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1977) (shareholders, officers, and directors); Pitchford v. Pepsi, Inc., 531
F.2d 92, 97-98 (10th Cir.) (company president), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Reibert v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 729-33 (10th Cir.) (employees), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938
(1973); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (per
curiam) (employee and sole shareholder), afg, 30 F. Supp. 389, 391 (S.D.N.Y 1939); Athletes
Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., 445 F. Supp. 35, 52 (D. Del. 1977) (officers, directors,
and shareholders); Deaktor v. Fox Grocery Co., 332 F. Supp. 536, 541 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (share-
holders and employees); Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D. La.)
(employee), afd, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148
F. Supp. 299, 302-03 (D. Mass.) (potential employee), affd, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 828 (1957); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of Am., 36 F.2d 959, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (employee
and shareholder); see generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTiTRusT LAW 198-201 (1978).
22. These tests included: (1) direct injury: "Those harmed only incidentally by antitrust
violations have no standing to sue for treble damages; only those at whom the violation is directly
aimed, or who have been directly harmed may recover." Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prod.
Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); see Reibert v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Kauffman v.
Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Volasco
Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 907 (1963); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
(2) foreseeability of injury: the plaintiff must prove he was "within the area of the economy
which [the defendant] reasonably could have or did foresee would be endangered by the break-
down of competitive conditions." Alaska v. Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
(3) zone of interests: the plaintiff must prove "that the defendant caused him injury in fact,"
and that "the interest sought to be protected ... is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Malamud v. Sin-
clair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1975).
(4) target area: the plaintiff must show that "he is within that area of the economy which is
endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry." Conference of
Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919
(1952); see Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 17-19 (1st
Cir. 1979); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975); Calderone Enters.
Corp. v. United Artist Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 930 (1972); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d 166, 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 943 (1969); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergians Farm Dairy, 368 F.2d 679, 688-89
(8th Cir. 1966).
(5) balancing: section 4 standing analysis "is essentially a balancing test comprised of many
constant and variable factors and . . . there is no capable talismanic test." Bravman v. Basset
Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99-100 (3d Cir.) (considered "[plaintiff's] relationship to the de-
fendants, his position in the area of the economy threatened by the alleged anticompetitive acts,
the directness of his alleged injury and the Congressional policies"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823
(1977).
23. Consumers and competitors are frequently granted standing, while employees, share-
holders, suppliers, and creditors of injured businesses are not. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note
2, at 820.
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standing analysis is much broader than the antitrust injury question; mere an-
titrust injury does not guarantee that standing will be granted.
It was against this background that the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue
of antritrust standing in a retaliatory discharge case. In Ostrofe v. H.S.
Crocker Co.,2 the court focused on balancing competing policy interests and
granted the employee standing.25 Frank Ostrofe, a former marketing director
for the H.S. Crocker Co., brought a private treble damage action against his
employer, a manufacturer of lithograph labels. 26 He alleged that the label
manufacturers had conspired to fix prices, submit rigged bids, and allocate
customers in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 7 Ostrofe alleged that
he was forced to resign for refusing to cooperate in the conspiracy, and that he
was boycotted from further employment in the industry.2 8 Crocker moved to
dismiss on the ground that Ostrofe lacked standing. The district court granted
the motion in part, holding that Ostrofe could not attack the agreement to fix
prices, but that he could challenge the separate conspiracy alleged-the agree-
ment to deny him further employment.2 9 Crocker filed a motion for summary
judgment supported by depositions and affidavits negating the existence of any
agreement among label manufacturers not to employ Ostrofe. Ostrofe moved
24. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded mem., 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
25. Id. at 1386. Although some commentators have advocated a policy approach to anti-
trust standing, they have been unable to agree on what policies are relevant and the weight to be
given to each in the "balancing" process. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 845. Berger
and Bernstein have identified two policies served by private antitrust suits: compensation for injury
and deterrence of anticompetitive conduct. Five policies are identifed for limiting standing: elimi-
nation of windfall recoveries, avoidance of ruinous recoveries, avoidance of duplicative recoveries,
reduction of speculative recoveries, and reduction of judicial administrative costs. Id. at 850.
Professor Handler has listed ten factors that should be considered in determining standing:
the nature and seriousness of the violation; the number of persons who have been harmed and
their relationship to the defendant and to each other; the possibility of double recovery if everyone
is permitted to sue; the possibility of protecting the interests of all those harmed by a single
lawsuit; the specific intent of the defendant to cause injury to particular classes of persons; the
reasonable foreseeability of injury; whether denial of standing in the particular case would frus-
trate the dominant purpose of private litigation as a means of enforcing the antitrust laws; the
degree and extent of harm actually suffered by the plaintiff; the reliability of the monetary esti-
mates of damage; and the fact that section 4 provides for treble damages. Handler, The Shift
from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30-31
(1971). But cf. Lytle & Purdue, supra note 19, at 807 (Handler's approach "reduces standing
decisions to a series of ad hoc determinations, often inconsistent and certainly unpredictable").
Professor Tyler has identified two policies served by private antitrust suits: compensation of
victims and enforcement of national policy in favor of competition. He has stated that the primary
and overriding justification for a liberal standing doctrine is deterrence. Tyler, supra note 19, at
277. Three policies are identified for limiting standing: the potential liability of defendants, added
administrative and social cost, and the concern that a liberal standing rule may undermine the
effectiveness of the antitrust laws. Id.
26. 670 F.2d at 1380.
27. Consent decrees prohibiting such practices had previously been issued against Crocker.
United States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,883, at 73,702 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 30, 1976) (prohibiting allocating or dividing customers, territories or markets, fixing prices,
or furnishing price information unless it is generally available to users of paper labels); United
States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,615, at 67,703 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25,
1975) (same).
28. 670 F.2d at 1380.
29. Id.
4
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to amend his complaint to specifically allege a unilateral refusal by Crocker to
deal with him. The district court denied Ostrofe's motion and granted sum-
mary judgment for Crocker."0
The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Ostrofe had standing.31 The
court of appeals first stated that the district court erred in granting defen-
dant's motion to dismiss.32 Persons injured by refusals to deal as part of a
conspiracy to restrain or monopolize trade or commerce have been permitted
to challenge the conspiracy as a whole even though their injuries did not result
from the restraint on competition that was the principal object of the conspir-
acy.33 The court concluded, therefore, that Ostrofe had standing to challenge
30. Id. at 1380-81.
31. Id. at 1381-89.
32. Id. at 1381. The Ninth Circuit stated that the district court improperly viewed Os-
trofe's original claim to allege two separate lawsuits: one challenging a conspiracy to fix prices and
allocate customers, the other attacking an agreement to boycott Ostrofe from employment.
33. Id. at 1382. Judge Kennedy, dissenting in Ostrofe, criticized the majority's reasoning:
The cases cited for the proposition that persons have been permitted to challenge
conspiracies as a whole even though their injuries resulted not from the principal object
of the conspiracy ... are quite inappropriate here, for they involved boycotts that were
the same type as, and a part of, the larger conspiracy. . . . Here Ostrofe's discharge
was a matter of employee coercion apart from the main price fixing scheme that the
antitrust laws are designed to deter.
Id. at 1390-91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority cited Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, 340 U.S. 211
(1951); Solinger v. A & M Records, 586 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908
(1979); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967); Standard Oil of Calif. v.
Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958). 670 F.2d at 1382. In
Radovich, the plaintiff was the object of a conspiracy by NFL owners to boycott players and
coaches from a competing league. 352 U.S. at 446-47. In Nichols, the plaintiff was the object of a
no-switching agreement in which publishers restricted employment of each other's former employ-
ees. 371 F.2d at 333-34. In both cases, the alleged conspiracies were aimed directly at restricting
labor markets and the claimed loss of employment resulted from the principal object of the anti-
trust violation. In Keifer-Stewart, the owner of a wholesale liquor business alleged that the defen-
dants agreed not to sell liquor to the plaintiff unless he agreed to their prices. 340 U.S. at 212. In
Standard Oil, a gasoline retailer claimed damages as a result of a conspiracy by oil companies to
refuse to supply petroleum products. The plaintiff claimed that the object of the conspiracy was to
restrain or monopolize gasoline sales. 251 F.2d at 196. In Keifer-Stewart and Standard Oil, the
plaintiffs' injuries resulted from the restraints on competition that were the principle objects of the
conspiracies.
Solinger further illustrates the erroneous use of precedent by the Ostrofe majority. In Sol-
inger, the antitrust action was brought by the president of Independent Music Sales, Inc. (IMS),
an independent distributor of records and tapes, against two record manufacturers. 586 F.2d at
1306-07. Solinger initiated negotiations to purchase IMS from its sole shareholder and contacted
the defendants to see if they would retain IMS as their distributor after the purchase. Both com-
panies indicated that they would not. As a result, Solinger claimed that he did not complete the
purchase. Shortly thereafter, both manufacturers terminated IMS as a distributor, and without
these contracts, the company went out of business. Solinger brought a private treble damage ac-
tion alleging that the defendants refused to deal with IMS because, pursuant to his directions as
president, IMS refused to comply with a territorial allocation plan agreed to by the defendants in
violation of § I of the Sherman Act. The court held that as a prospective purchaser of a company
and a new potential entrant into the market, Solinger might have standing to challenge the an-
ticompetitive refusal to deal. 586 F.2d at 1309. Finding that Solinger was within the area of the
economy endangered by defendants' antitrust violation, the court remanded the issue to the dis-
trict court. The court distinguished Solinger's claim as an employee of IMS:
Solinger does not, however, have standing in his capacity as an employee of IMS to
5
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the price-fixing conspiracy because he was boycotted from employment, pursu-
ant to the larger conspiracy.34
The court of appeals also held that the district court had erred in denying
Ostrofe leave to amend his complaint to allege standing on the grounds that he
was unilaterally discharged by Crocker as a means of effectuating the scheme
to fix prices and allocate customers.35 Generally, parties injured by unilateral
conduct of one conspirator in furtherance of an unlawful restraint of trade
have been permitted to challenge the overall conspiracy. 6
Crocker argued that it would extend liability too far if standing were
given to persons injured by a refusal to deal by a single conspirator in further-
ance of a price-fixing conspiracy.37 Various tests have been used to limit the
expansive liability that would flow from a literal interpretation of section 4.
The court criticized these tests for producing inconsistent and unpredictable
results.3s At best, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, these tests are useful to resolve
clear cases; less obvious cases require a balancing of competing policy
interests.39
The court discussed the policies favoring standing for employees dis-
pursue his claims under Section 1. He is not within the area of the economy that the
antitrust laws were designed to protect .... His loss of salary was merely incidental to
the alleged antitrust violation and was not within the area of the economy that the
defendants should have foreseen would be affected by its violation.
Id. at 1310-11 (citation omitted). On remand, the district court rejected Solinger's claim as a
potential purchaser. On the second appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed: "Whatever value this the-
ory may have had at the time it was advanced when this case first came before us, . . . its legal
basis evaporated with the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of traditional views of standing in anti-
trust cases in Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council.....
Solinger v. A & M Records, 718 F.2d 298, 299 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see notes 89-125
and accompanying text infra (discussion of Associated General).
34. At least one court has attempted to distinguish Ostrofe on the grounds that the plain-
tiff alleged an industry-wide conspiracy not to employ him, as opposed to a unilateral refusal by
his prior employer. See Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(Ostrofe was decided incorrectly under either theory).
35. 670 F.2d at 1382.
36. Id. at 1382 n.5 (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Engine Speciali-
ties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1979); Lee Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co.,
599 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1979); Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir.
1967)). Judge Kennedy took exception to the majority's use of precedent:
[P]arties injured by unilateral conduct in furtherance of an unlawful restraint of
trade have been permitted to challenge the overall scheme only when the unilateral
conduct was part of, and created the same type of injury as, the main unlawful restraint
conspiracy. . . . The plaintiff in the instant case was not in the target area of either the
price fixing conspiracy or a unilateral discharge in direct furtherance of the elimination
of competition, and his motion to amend was properly denied.
670 F.2d at 1391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
37. 670 F.2d at 1382.
38. Id. The same criticism is applicable to the Ninth Circuit's policy approach. See note
25 supra.
39. Id. at 1382-83. The majority did not indicate what would constitute a "clear" case. Cf
Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971)
("[T]here are few 'bright lines' in the area, even experts who have devoted their entire profes-
sional lives to the practice of antitrust law often find it impossible to advise a client."), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972).
6
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charged for refusing to cooperate in antitrust violations. First, granting stand-
ing facilitates enforcement of the antitrust laws.40 No conspiracy to fix prices
and allocate customers can succeed without the cooperation of the responsible
employees of each competitor. If the employee participates in the conspiracy,
detection and criminal liability are unlikely. Standing increases the incentive
for disclosure and facilitates detection of the conspiracy.41 Second, granting
standing prevents or mitigates injury to those who are the ultimate objects of
the violation--competitors and consumers. A timely suit by a discharged em-
ployee may help prevent irreparable destruction of competitive conditions.42
Third, the court reasoned that the harm suffered by the employee was not
remote or indirect.4
3
40. 670 F.2d at 1384.
41. Id. Judge Kennedy noted that deterrence can always be used to rationalize extending
standing to a new and unregulated area of conduct. Congress, however, did not design the anti-
trust laws to reach employment relations as an enforcement mechanism. It made participation in
the antitrust violation a criminal offense, and this is a more direct and proper deterrent than
providing the windfall of treble damage recovery to the discharged employee. Id. at 1391-92
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Denying standing to the discharged employee does not preclude compet-
itors and consumers from challenging the conspiracy. Private actions are merely a part of the
overall antitrust law enforcement scheme. Violations of the antitrust laws are subject to civil in-junctive actions, 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 131-40 (1978), and, in many
cases, criminal sanctions. Id. at 27-29; Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanc-
tions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CH. L. REv. 423 (1963); see also L. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST 751-59 (1977) (government enforcment); see generally S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: CASES AND COMMENTS 22-27 (1968) (antitrust remedies); Lytle &
Purdue, supra note 19, at 801.
Some commentators have questioned the effectiveness of private actions as a deterrent to
antitrust violations. E.g., Breit & Elzina, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An
Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 693, 705-06 (1973) (managers in modern oligopolistic
industries are risk averse and are more likely to be deterred by a high financial penalty than by
increased probability of detection and conviction where accompanying penalties are not severe);
Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1337
(1973) (private antitrust actions are not an effective deterrent); see generally Guilfoil, Private
Enforcement of United States Antitrust Law, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 747 (1965); Parker, The De-
terrent Effect of Private Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M. L. REV. 286 (1973);
Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970). But see
Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 168-69
(1958) (because of the treble damages provision, private suits may be a more effective deterrent
than government enforcement); Tyler, supra note 19, at 269 n.2, 285 (deterrence is best achieved
by removing obstacles to private suits).
In Ostrofe, Judge Kennedy noted that the employee discharged for refusing to violate anti-
trust laws has other causes of action to deter retaliatory discharge, including wrongful discharge
in tort and breach of contract. 670 F.2d at 1392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); see also notes
130-33 and accompanying text infra (erosion of the employment at will rule).
42. 670 F.2d at 1384-85.
43. Id. at 1385. The majority recognized that the Ninth Circuit had denied standing to
employees who suffered injuries only incidental to an antitrust violation. Other circuits have
granted employees standing, however, when they are able to show direct injury. The majority cited
Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967), and Nichols v. Spencer Int'l
Press, 317 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967), as authority for the proposition that Ostrofe was directly
injured and should be given standing as a former employee. 670 F.2d at 1385 n.13. These cases
are inapposite because the employees given standing were within the area of the economy
threatened by the anticompetitive result of the antitrust violation. In Dailey, a sales agent alleged
a job loss as a result of the monopolistic acquisition of his employer. The court noted that as a
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The court concluded that the disadvantages to allowing suit were mini-
mal. Suits by employees discharged for refusing to commit antitrust violations
are not so numerous as to cause a flood of litigation or impose ruinous
financial burdens on defendants.' The court found that damages would be
neither speculative nor difficult to calculate and that recovery would not be
duplicative.4 5 Furthermore, the penalty was not unfairly imposed because the
conduct was clearly illegal.46 Finally, allowing suit would satisfy the remedial
purposes of the antitrust laws.4
7
After concluding that the policies weighed sharply in favor of granting
standing, the Ninth Circuit attempted to reconcile its holding with Brunswick.
Brunswick could be read as limiting section 4 suits to injuries caused by the
anticompetitive effects of the particular antitrust violation. 4 This interpreta-
tion would prevent suits by employees injured by unilateral conduct of an em-
ployer acting in furtherance of the conspiracy.49 The Ostrofe court rejected
this construction.5 0
The plaintiff in Brunswick alleged injuries as a result of an antitrust vio-
commission sales agent with a distinct business interest in his sales territory, the plaintiff had a
sufficient business or property interest under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The court distinguished the
plaintiff's claim from cases where the business or property is that of the corporation and the claim
asserted by the employee is derivative. Under the target area test, the plaintiff was "within the
sector of the economy in which the violation threatened a breakdown of competitive conditions."
380 F.2d at 487. The fallacy in the majority's reliance on Nichols has been discussed. See note 33
and accompanying text supra.
44. 670 F.2d at 1385. But cf. note 19 supra (risk of duplicative recovery).
45. Id. Under treble damage recovery, only one-third of the award is compensatory, The
remaining two-thirds are more punitive than remedial. Allowing discharged employees to recover
would be redundant in that the punitive portion of the treble damage award would be duplicated
in suits brought by competitors and consumers more directly injured by the antitrust violation. See
Parker, supra note 41, at 287-88.
46. 670 F.2d at 1385. The majority failed to distinguish between the defendant's price
fixing and the separate act of discharging the recalcitrant employee. Nevertheless, allowing ac-
tions for wrongful discharge would more fairly penalize the employer. See notes 130-33 and ac-
companying text infra.
47. Id. at 1386. Congress did not give standing to every citizen who, motivated by public
spirit or possibly some baser reason, would set himself up as a watchdog of business behavior.
SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d 166, 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943
(1969). Allowing remote plaintiffs to recover treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act is a
windfall. See Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United States Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, 320 F. Supp.
699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970); Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Foods, 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.
Mass. 1956); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd per
curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954); Note, Antitrust-Treble Dam-
age Actions-Private Litigant Whose Injury Was Reasonably Foreseeable Has Standing to Sue,
24 VAND. L. REV. 803, 807 (1971). But cf Tyler, supra note 19, at 289 ("[A]II recoveries by
plaintiffs in antitrust actions are windfalls because damages are trebled. The windfall is no greater
because the plaintiff was injured only peripherally, rather than directly.").
48. See text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
49. 670 F.2d at 1387. The majority acknowledged that similar language appears in lower
court decisions. Judge Kennedy pointed out that two of the three cases footnoted by the majority
for this proposition are Ninth Circuit opinions squarely contrary to the majority's theory, Id. at
1390 n.2 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see generally Calvani, The Mushrooming Brunswick Defense:
Injury to Competition, Not to Plaintiff, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 324-33 (1981).
50. 670 F.2d at 1387. But see id. at 1389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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lation affecting competition; however, the claim was not based upon injury
stemming from conduct in furtherance of the antitrust violation.5" The Ostrofe
court stated that the controlling factor in both situations is congressional in-
tent.52 In a Brunswick-type violation, the congressional concern is with com-
petitive conditions in the product market, so standing is limited to competitors
and consumers directly injured by the breakdown in competition. Neverthe-
less, Congress is also concerned with the conduct of individuals acting on be-
half of antitrust conspirators. This concern is evidenced by the imposition of
criminal liability on the individuals effectuating the conspiracy.5" The Ostrofe
court reasoned that in retaliatory discharge cases the employee is injured as a
result of his efforts to comply with the Sherman Act." Thus Ostrofe suffered
an "antitrust injury . . . of the type the antitrust laws were intended to pre-
vent."55 The court also noted that Ostrofe's injury did not result from in-
creased competition, as was the case in Brunswick. Ostrofe's injury resulted
from a conspirator's efforts to realize an anticompetitive purpose.56 Finally, the
Ostrofe court concluded that the discharged employee's injury was intimately
related to the circumstances that made the conspirator's conduct unlawful.57
District courts in the Third Circuit have failed to agree on whether em-
ployees claiming retaliatory discharge have standing. In a case of first impres-
sion, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in McNulty
v. Borden, Inc., (McNulty 1)58 denied the defendant's motion to dismiss a suit
brought by an employee claiming that he was discharged when he complained
of his company's discriminatory pricing practices. 59 The court found that the
loss of employment was an injury to business or property,60 that the loss was
caused by reason of an antitrust violation, and that granting standing was con-
sistent with congressional purposes for enacting section 4.61 The court empha-
sized that Congress intended section 4 to be available to the people, and that
deterrence is an important goal of the antitrust laws.62
51. The majority footnoted three cases in which plaintiffs injured by conduct in further-
ance of an unlawful restraint rather than its ultimate effect may have standing. 670 F.2d at 1387
n.25. The dissent pointed out, however, that standing in these cases has been allowed only where
the injury suffered was the same type of injury as would result from the ultimate effect of the
violation. Id. at 1391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
52. 670 F.2d at 1387.
53. Id. at 1387-88; see United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1q62); note 41 supra.
54. 670 F.2d at 1388.
55. Id.
56. Id. Nevertheless, the injury did not occur within the area of the economy threatened
by the anticompetititve purpose. See notes 77-83 and accompanying text infra.
57. 670 F.2d at 1388 (citing Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Un-
precedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 990 (1977)).
58. 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979), modified, 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
59. Id. at 1113-14; see Robinson-Patman Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
60. 474 F. Supp. at 1116-17. The court reasoned that an employee who loses his job is
injured in his property; job loss is so closely analogous to the interest invaded by damage to one's
business that the two are indistinguishable. The plaintiff also alleged loss of bonus compensation
as a result of diminished sales in his territory due to the alleged violation. Id. at 1117-18.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1118. But see note 47 supra.
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Three years later, in Callahan v. Scott Paper Co.,0 3 the Eastern District
reversed its position. Two former employees of the defendant alleged that they
were fired for objecting to Scott's violation of the antitrust laws. 4 While rec-
ognizing that the injury was easily proved and that policy arguments sup-
ported granting the plaintiffs standing, the court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss.05 The court found that there was no reason to engage in a
policy debate because the antitrust laws were not designed to prevent the in-
jury suffered by the plaintiffs.68 Moreover, the plaintiffs were not injured be-
cause Scott violated the antitrust laws, but because they complained of the
infraction. The Callahan court rejected Ostrofe's interpretation of Bruns-
wick.67 Rather than focusing on the congressional concerns underlying the
substantive antitrust law allegedly violated, the court looked at whether the
plaintiffs' damages were caused by the anticompetitive effect of the violation
alleged.68
In Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line,"9 the Western District of Pennsylvania
followed Ostrofe's policy approach. The plaintiff alleged that he was dis-
charged from his position as a truck driver because he refused to transport
overloaded trucks and threatened to alert law enforcement authorities of the
practice.70 The court held that the plaintiff's relationship with the defendants
was immediate rather than indirect, and that the plaintiff's injury flowed di-
rectly from the alleged antitrust violation.71 Citing Ostrofe, the Shaw court
stated that the policies behind section 4 favored suits by discharged employ-
ees, 2 and denied the motion to dismiss the antitrust claim for lack of
standing.73
In Bichan, the Seventh Circuit rejected the employee's position accepted
in Ostrofe and Shaw. Robert Bichan brought a private treble damage action
against his former employer, Chemetron, and other corporations in the indus-
63. 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
64. The plaintiffs also alleged that their employer's unlawful practices caused them to suf-
fer economic injury in the form of reduced bonuses and reduced opportunities for advancement.
Id. at 553. The court denied standing, finding that: the employees' injuries were derivative of
injuries suffered by non-favored consumers; the illegal acts were not aimed at the plaintiffs, and
the damages alleged were conjectural. Id. at 557-60.
65. Id. at 560-61.
66. Id. at 560.
67. The court distinguished Ostrofe as involving a group boycott against an employee by
all firms in the industry. Id. at 561. But see note 32 supra (Ninth Circuit rejected this characteri-
zation of Ostrofe's claim).
68. Id. Callahan was followed in McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (McNulty I1) (overruling McNulty I as "unsupported by case law"), and Booth v. Radio
Shack Div., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,001 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1982).
69. 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
70. Id. The plaintiff alleged two related conspiracies: one to restrain trade and one to dis-
charge him. Although the second conspiracy was not actionable under the antitrust laws, the
plaintiff was granted standing to challenge his discharge as an act in furtherance of the restraint
of trade. Id. at 780 n.5.
71. Id. at 780-81.
72. Id. at 780.
73. Id. at 781.
[Vol. 49
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trial gas industry. He alleged that a conspiracy existed to fix prices, impose
conditions of sales, and allocate customers. 4 Bichan claimed that he was fired
from his position as president of Chemetron's Industrial Gas Division and
blacklisted by the industry because he refused to adhere to these illegal prac-
tices. The district court dismissed the complaint.75 The Seventh Circuit af-
firmed on the grounds that Bichan did not suffer an "antitrust injury," and
that he was not the "proper party" to bring a treble damage action .7
Initially, the court of appeals noted that the plaintiff's injury was not di-
rectly caused by the anticompetitive effect of the antitrust violation.7 Bichan's
claim was distinguished from cases in which antitrust conspiracies are in-
tended to restrict competitive conditions in the labor market, and cases where
the injuries, restriction, or loss of employment are directly related to anticom-
petitive restraints.78 The conspiracy in Bichan was aimed at competitors within
the industry, and the direct injury of this anticompetitive conduct was limited
to competitors and consumers.7 9 Citing Brunswick, the court noted that stand-
ing did not exist merely because Bichan's injury was caused "by reason of" the
antitrust conspiracy.80 Applying the "target area" test for section 4 standing,81
the court focused on the area affected by the defendant's anticompetitive con-
duct."2 Because his injury did not flow from a lessening of competition, Bichan
was not within the target area of the antitrust violation and did not suffer an
"antitrust injury."8 3
74. 681 F.2d at 515.
75. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 1981-82 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64, 293, at 74,347-50 (N.D.
II1. Aug. 31, 1981), af'd, 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). The
district court held that Bichan did not suffer an "antitrust injury" because he failed to establish
that his loss of employment resulted from decreased competition. Moreover, he lacked standing
because he was not a "target" of the anticompetitive conduct. Id.
76. 681 F.2d at 515-20.
77. Id. at 518.
78. Id. at 517; see Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Nichols v.
Spencer Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1967); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972);
Anderson v. Shipowners Assoc., 272 U.S. 359 (1926); Quinonez v. National Assoc. of Sec. Deal-
ers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976); Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1957); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Seventh
Circuit also rejected Bichan's argument that McNulty v. Borden, Inc. (McNulty 1), 474 F. Supp.
1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) supported the antitrust injury claim. In McNulty I, the plaintiff alleged that
he was discharged for his refusal to commit an antitrust violation, and the court granted standing.
Id. at 1118. The Seventh Circuit stated that McNulty I was based on "faulty reasoning." 681
F.2d at 517-18. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has since reversed its position. See notes 63-
68 and accompanying text supra.
79. Only consumers and competitors directly injured by the anticompetitive conduct of an
antitrust violation have standing under § 4. See notes 113-20 and accompanying text infra.
80. 681 F.2d at 518-19.
81. The target area doctrine was first announced in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's
Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). The phrase "target
area" was coined in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 364-65 (9th Cir. 1955).
82. 681 F.2d at 518.
83. Id. at 518-19; see also Larry R. George Sales Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266,
271 (5th Cir. 1979) (recovery available only to those injured by the lessening of competition that
the antitrust laws were enacted to prevent); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183,
187 (2d Cir. 1970) (section 4 "by reason of" causation requirement must "link a specific form of
illegal act to a plaintiff engaged in the sort of legitimate activities which the prohibition of this
11
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The Seventh Circuit also held that antitrust injury is not the sole determi-
nant of whether a plaintiff may maintain a treble damage suit.84 Even if
Bichan had proven an antitrust injury, he was not the proper party to bring a
treble damage action.85 While phrasing the discussion in terms of remoteness,
the court expressed a desire to keep complex antitrust trials within judicially
manageable limits. Allowing recovery to anyone injured by reason of an anti-
trust violation would flood the courts with litigation.8 The court limited stand-
ing to those plaintiffs capable of efficiently enforcing the antitrust laws.87
While noting that deterrence and redress are important, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that these policies must be balanced against the need to avoid ex-
cessive treble damage litigation. The balance is achieved by granting standing
only to consumers or competitors who suffer immediate injuries, excluding per-
sons whose injuries are more indirectly caused by the unlawful conduct.8
Bichan is consistent with the Supreme Court's current view of section 4's
limitations, as expressed in Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters.89 In Associated General, the plaintiffs and defen-
dants were parties to collective bargaining agreements in construction-related
industries. 0 The named plaintiffs (Unions) represented 50,000 individuals em-
ployed by the defendants.91 One of the defendants, Associated General Con-
tractors of California, Inc. (Associated), was a multiemployer association com-
posed of building and construction contractors.9 2 The Unions alleged that
Associated and its members had coerced third parties93 and some of Associ-
ated's members to hire contractors and subcontractors who were not signato-
ries to collective bargaining agreements with the Unions. The Unions claimed
that Associated's actions adversely affected the trade of unionized firms, re-
straining the Unions' business activities.
The Unions brought a treble damage action alleging that Associated vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4 The district court dismissed the claim, 95
type of violation was clearly intended to protect"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
84. 681 F.2d at 519.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292,
1295 (2d Cir. 1971) (dangers of expanding standing), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Lytle &
Purdue, supra note 19, at 801 (same).
87. See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
88. 681 F.2d at 520.
89. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
90. Id. at 900.
91. The two unions filed a class action claim on their own behalf and on behalf of their
affiliated local unions and district councils. See California State Council of Carpenters v. Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd, 648 F.2d 527, 540-41
(9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983); see generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIs 87-
90 (3d ed. 1981); 7 & 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1751-1803 (1972 & Supp. 1983) (procedural aspects of antitrust class actions).
92. Associated, its individual members, and 1,000 unidentified co-conspirators were named
as defendants. 103 S. Ct. at 900.
93. The third parties were identified as owners of land and others who let construction
contracts. Id.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see note 17 supra.
[Vol. 49
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and the Ninth Circuit reversed.98 The court of appeals held that: (1) the Un-
ions alleged a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act; (2) Associated's
conduct was not within the antitrust exemption for labor activities; and (3) the
Unions had standing to recover damages for injuries to their business activities
caused by defendants' "industry-wide boycott against all subcontractors with
whom the Unions had signed agreements. 917 The court reasoned that the Un-
ions were within the area of the economy endangered by the breakdown of
competitive conditions because the injuries were a foreseeable consequence of
the antitrust violation and were specifically intended by the defendants. 8
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Unions did not have
standing.99 Assuming that the defendants' conduct violated the antitrust laws,
the Court stated that it did not necessarily follow that the Unions were injured
by a violation of the antitrust laws within the meaning of section 4.101
Initially, the Court examined the scope of section 4. If read literally, the
statute would be "broad enough to encompass every harm that can be attrib-
uted directly or indirectly to the consequences of an antitrust violation."101
The Court rejected this interpretation as contrary to congressional intent, 102
95. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 404 F.
Supp. 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd, 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897
(1983). The district court characterized the unions' claim.as alleging that the defendants "violated
the antitrust laws insofar as they declined to enter into agreements with plaintiffs." The court
reasoned that the employers' refusal to enter into such agreements could not support an antitrust
claim. Id.
96. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 648 F.2d
527 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
97. Id. at 531-39.
98. Id. at 537-38.
99. 103 S. Ct. at 913.
100. Id. at 904.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 904-07. The Court acknowledged that prior cases had paraphrased the statute in
an expansive way. For example:
The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to compet-
itors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by
any of these .... The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all
who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.
Mandeville Island Farms v. Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (citations omitted); see also
Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473 (1982) (absent "some articulable consideration of
statutory policy suggesting a contrary conclusion in a particular factual setting, we have applied
§ 4 in accordance with its plain language and its broad remedial and deterrent objectives"); Rei-
ter v. SonotoneCorp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (in rejecting the argument that the § 4 remedy is
available only to redress injury to commercial interest, the Court afforded "property" its "natu-
rally broad and inclusive meaning," and held consumers have a § 4 remedy reflecting the increase
in the purchase price of goods attributable to a price fixing conspiracy); Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434
U.S. 308, 312-15 (1978) (afforded the statutory phrase "any person" its "naturally broad and
inclusive meaning," and extended it to include foreign sovereigns).
In Associated General, however, the Court noted that in these cases the "plaintiff was di-
rectly harmed by the defendants' unlawful conduct. The paraphrasing of the language of § 4 in
those opinions added nothing to the even broader language that the statute itself contains." 103 S.
Ct. at 904 n.19. But cf. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656,
660 (1961) (per curiam) (to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act, "allegations adequate to
show a violation and, in a private treble damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all
the law requires"); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957) ("[T]his
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for Congress intended antitrust damages litigation to be subject to constraints
analogous to accepted common law rules. 10 3 Early federal cases interpreting
section 7 of the Sherman Act,1'0 the forerunner of section 4 of the Clayton
Act, had applied common law principles to restrict the literal meaning of the
treble damages remedy.103 When Congress enacted section 4 of the Clayton
Act in 1914 and 1955, it adopted the language of section 7 and the judicial
gloss that avoided a literal interpretation. 06 The Court noted that virtually all
lower courts had concluded that Congress did not intend to provide an anti-
trust remedy for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust
violation. 0 7 Thus, the decision to grant standing could be determined only by
examining the "plaintiff's harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants,
and the relationship between them."' 0 8
The Court acknowledged the struggle to articulate tests for determining
standing in antitrust treble damage actions.10 9 Although it was impossible to
announce a rule that would decide standing in every case, the Court set forth a
framework for analyzing the factors that determine the appropriateness of
granting standing. Two factors favored recognizing the Unions' claims: the
plaintiffs alleged a causal connection between the antitrust violation and their
court should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set
forth by Congress.").
103. 103 S. Ct. at 905; see 21 CoNG. REc. 2456 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (bill
"does not announce a new principle of law, but applies only well recognized principles of the
common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government"); 21 CoNG.
REc. 3151-52 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Hoar) (courts will apply the common law meaning of the
term "monopoly" to determine its legal significance).
104. Ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15(1982)). Section 7 was superseded by § 4 of the Clayton Act in 1914, which provided for private
actions under all the antitrust laws. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S. § 15 (1982)). Section 7 was repealed in 1955. Act of July 7, 1955, ch.
283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283. The treble damage provision in § 7 of the Sherman Act was not
substantially changed by § 4 of the Clayton Act, which was reenacted in 1955. 69 Stat. 282.
105. 103 S. Ct. at 905-06. The Court reasoned that just as § 1 has not been interpreted
literally, neither should § 7. "[Section] 1 of the Sherman Act ... says that 'every' contract that
restrains trade is unlawful .... [R]ead literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of private
contract law .... Congress, however, did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the
full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations." Id. (quoting National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978)). The Court recognized the
evolving nature of common law and stated that limitations on recoveries which existed in 1890
were not intended to be permanent. Nevertheless, legislators recognizing the role of common law
could not have intended § 7 to be construed literally. 103 S. Ct. at 906 n.28.
106. 103 S. Ct. at 907; see Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1919)(denied § 7 treble damage recovery to creditor and stockholder of a corporation that was injured
by a violation of the antitrust laws because the plaintiff's injury was "indirect, remote, and conse-
quential"). In Loeb, the court noted that prior to the passage of § 7, the remedy for such an
injury resided solely in the corporation. The court reasoned that despite § 7's comprehensive na-
ture, it was passed "with full knowledge of existing law in that respect." Id.; see also Ames v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 822-23 (D. Mass. 1909) (applied "ordinary principles of
law" and held that stockholder did not have standing against defendants for illegally acquiring the
corporation and rendering plaintiff's stock worthless).
107. 103 S. Ct. at 907 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972)).
108. Id.
109. Id.; see note 22 supra.
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injury, and that the defendants intended to cause that injury.11 0 Nevertheless,
the Court observed that merely because the claim literally fell within section
4, it did not follow that standing was warranted."1 1 Nor was the remedy a
question of the specific intent of the conspirators. 1 2
Other factors supported denying the Unions' treble damage action. Focus-
ing on the nature of the alleged injury, 13 the Court found that the injury must
be the type that the antitrust statute was intended to prevent.124 After noting
that the purpose of the Sherman Act is to assure customers the benefit of price
competition and protect the economic freedom of competitors in the market-
place," 5 the Court held that the Unions were neither consumers nor competi-
tors in the market in which trade was restrained."" Further, the Unions' goal
of benefiting their members was not necessarily served by the uninhibited com-
petition in the labor market." 7 Therefore, the antitrust laws were not designed
to protect the Unions from the injury alleged.
The Court also found that it was appropriate to consider the "directness
or indirectness of the asserted injury" as a standing factor." 8 The Unions al-
leged that the defendants had coerced third parties to divert business to non-
union contractors. The Court reasoned that the Unions' harm was only an
indirect result of whatever harm may have been suffered by the union contrac-
tors."19 Because the Unions' injuries were indirect and may have been caused
by other independent factors, the Court found the Unions' claims to be highly
speculative. 120 As another factor weighing against standing, the Court noted
that denying the Unions standing would not leave the antitrust violation un-
checked. Parties injured more directly could sue to protect the public interest
110. 103 S. Ct. at 908.
111. Id.; see notes 101-06 and accompanying text supra.
112. 103 S. Ct. at 908. While proof of improper motive may support a plaintiff's treble
damage claim in a particular factual situation, by itself it will not always be sufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 908 nn.35 & 36. On the other hand, the absence of a specific
intent to harm the plaintiff will not necessarily render an injury too remote. Id. n.37; see Blue
Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 485 (1982) (granted standing to a consumer injured by a
group boycott despite the defendants' claim that they merely intended to eliminate competitors
from the market).
113. 103 S. Ct. at 908.
114. Id. at 910 (citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487-88).
115. Id. at 908-09; see United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 619 (1972).
116. 103 S. Ct. at 909. The Court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege effects
throughout "an entire competitive market," because the conduct was directed only at certain par-
ties. Id. n.40.
117. The union's goal of increased wages and improved working conditions for its members
is not necessarily served by uninhibited competition among employers to reduce costs and obtain a
competitive advantage in the marketplace. This fact is recognized by exempting certain labor
activities from the antitrust laws and by federal laws designed to protect labor unions. In light of
this background, "a union, in its capacity as bargaining representative, will frequently not be part
of the class the Sherman Act was designed to protect, especially in disputes with employers with
whom it bargains." Id. at 910.
118. Id.
119. Id. Because the complaint failed to specifically allege an injury, the Court was left to
hypothesize, and reject as indirect, the plaintiffs' injuries. Id. n.46.
120. Id. at 911.
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served by the enforcement of the antitrust laws.121
Finally, the Court felt that it was important to keep the scope of complex
antitrust trials within judicially manageable limits. 122 The Court noted that
prior cases have stressed the need to avoid duplicative recoveries 123 and com-
plex apportionment of damages.12' These factors weighed "heavily" against
recognizing the Unions' antitrust claim.12 5
Associated General clarified the standards under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.126 The case signals a clear rejection of the mechanical tests the lower
courts have used to determine standing.127 While the Seventh Circuit can be
faulted for such an approach in Bichan, the Ninth Circuit properly foresaw
the demise of these outmoded tests in Ostrofe. Future decisions should use a
case-by-case analysis based upon the Associated General criteria.128 The
amorphous distinction between antitrust injury and antitrust standing should
diminish in importance. 2
Bichan properly recognized that while the claims of employees discharged
for refusing to participate in antitrust violations may be linked to anticompeti-
tive conduct, their injuries are beyond the scope of section 4. In the past, the
analysis has fallen under the rubric of "antitrust injury." The court also recog-
nized that conduct is more efficiently challenged by directly injured parties,
like competitors and consumers, a concept labeled in Bichan as "antitrust
standing." Notwithstanding the questionable validity of these labels after As-
sociated General, the court's conclusion is correct.
121. Id. Nevertheless, the Court questioned whether there were any direct victims of the
alleged anticompetitive conduct. Id. n.4 7.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (denying recovery to
indirect purchasers in price-fixing conspiracy case); see also notes 17-21 and accompanying text
supra.
124. 103 S. Ct. at 912; see Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493
(1968) (denying defendant's request to discount the plaintiffs' damages claim to the extent that
overcharges had been passed on to the plaintiffs' customers).
125. 103 S. Ct. at 913.
126. See Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1084, 1086 n.9 (6th
Cir. 1983) (Associated General "removed all doubt as to the relevant inquiries to be implemented
by federal courts confronting the perimeters of § 4," although it is not clear whether the factors
listed in the case are exhaustive).
127. The Sixth Circuit has renounced the zone of interest test in favor of Associated Gen-
eral's criteria. See Meyer Goldberg, Inc. v. Goldberg, 717 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1983);
Southaven, 715 F.2d at 1086. The Ninth Circuit, however, still uses the target area test to deter-
mine whether § 4's "by reason of" requirement is satisfied. If no clear answer emerges from the
test, standing is determined by balancing the policy interests identified in Associated General.
Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983). The Eleventh Circuit continues to use the target
area test. Construction Aggregate Transp. v. Florida Rock Indus., 710 F.2d 752, 762-66 (lth
Cir. 1983).
128. See, e.g., McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1373-74 (8th Cir. 1983);
Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 965 (3d Cir. 1983); Indium Corp. of Am.
v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
129. See Note, Standing of the Terminated Employee Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 351 (1983) (the distinction between antitrust injury and standing
is merely a semantic trap).
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While antitrust standing doctrine should not be expanded to allow dis-
charged employees to recover treble damages, redress for the employee's in-
jury is compelling under other legal theories. A growing number of jurisdic-
tions have recognized public policy limitations on the traditional employment
at will doctrine.130 Some courts have imposed an implied contractual duty on
the part of the employer not to terminate employees for motives regarded as
violative of public policy.' 3 ' Another exception to the at will rule has been
recognized by many courts in suits of a tort nature for retaliatory discharge. 13 2
Suits by employees under wrongful discharge theories have been more success-
ful than claims based on section 4.133 Expanding contract and tort theories to
allow suits for wrongful discharge would achieve the policy benefits noted by
the Ninth Circuit'in Ostrofe as rationales for antitrust standing. These bene-
fits would not accrue at the expense of distorting the congressional intent to
limit the private treble damage remedy.
JAMES A. MONTEE
130. See generally Bakely, Erosion of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 8 J. CONT. L. 63(1982); Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management Considerations,
48 Mo. L. REV. 855 (1983); Madison, The Employee's Emerging Right to Sue for Arbitrary or
Unfair Discharge, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 422 (1981), Malin, Protecting the Whistleblowerfrom
Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277 (1983).
131. See, e.g., Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344
P.2d 25, 27-28 (1959) (refusal to commit perjury); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d
443, 453-54, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (engaging in union organizing activities).
132. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 184-85, 384 N.E.2d 353, 358-59
(1978) (filing workmen's compensation claim); Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I. Ry., 81 Mich. App.
489, 496, 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1978) (refusal to alter pollution control reports); O'Sullivan v.
Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 417, 390 A.2d 149, 150 (1978) (x-ray technician refused to perform
catheterizations in violation of state law); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 219, 536 P.2d 512, 515
(1975) (taking leave for jury service); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va.
1978) (bank employee dismissed for informing employer of bank's failure to comply with state
and federal consumer credit protection laws). Other courts have shown a willingness to allow
recovery if the discharged employee can show malicious intent by the employer. See Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 473, 427 A.2d 385, 389 (1980) (retaliation for employee's
insistence that employer comply with food and drug law).
133. See Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776, 779-80 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (dis-
missing treble damage action but allowing wrongful discharge cause of action under Pennsylvania
law); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1387-88 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (employee
discharged for refusing to violate § 1 of Sherman Act does not have treble damage action stand-
ing but does have action under Indiana law for wrongful discharge); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474
F. Supp. 1111, 1118-20 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (employee discharged for refusing to violate antitrust
laws has wrongful discharge action under Pennsylvania contract law). In Ostrofe, the dissent ar-
gued that under California law Ostrofe had contract and tort causes of action for wrongful dis-
charge. 670 F.2d at 1392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65
Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982) (wrongful discharge action allowed employee whose employer
induced her to leave the jurisdiction to prevent her from testifying before a grand jury investigat-
ing antitrust violations); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 171, 610 P.2d 1330,
1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (1980) (wrongful discharge action allowed against employer by
former retail sales representative who alleged he was discharged for refusing to participate in an
illegal price fixing scheme). But cf. Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 561-63 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (no cause of action under Pennsylvania law for employee alleging wrongful discharge
based on refusal to commit antitrust violation).
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